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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FOG OF
INNOVATION: A DEEP-DIVE ON GOVERNANCE AND THE
LIABILITY OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
By Brandon W. Jackson †
ABSTRACT
The convergence of various technological advancements has
caused numerous industries to pivot towards the development of
artificial intelligence and machine learning. With promises to
positively augment nearly all aspects of our daily lives, artificial
intelligence and machine learning have the potential to change the very
fabric of our society. To realize these benefits, or perhaps avoid the
forecasted perils of artificial intelligence, society must overcome
certain technological, legal, and social challenges. The complexity of
these issues is compounded by the fact that AI does not exist in a
vacuum, and it is intertwined with data rights, privacy rights,
intellectual property protection, ethics, civil rights, due process,
geopolitics, and social values, among other considerations. As with
many areas of innovation, the technology rapidly outpaces the law.
This paper seeks to further the discussion of governing artificial
intelligence systems and the role of liability as an indirect form of
regulation. It is premised on the likelihood that broad regulation of the
underlying technologies is unlikely in the United States given the
relevant infant state of artificial intelligence and the potential social
and economic benefits offered by machine learning. This paper
supports the contention that judicial decision-making will play a
significant role in shaping the artificial intelligence landscape. It
examines principles of agency and alternative legal identities as
applied to artificial intelligence. Further, this paper explores problems
associated with trying to apply common law principles of liability, such
as product liability and strict liability, to autonomous systems. As these
systems move towards greater autonomy, common law principles of
35
† The views expressed in this paper are expressly those of the author and do not reflect those of
the U.S. Government or Department of Defense. Brandon Jackson is an employee of the
Department of Defense and is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at The George Washington
University Law School. Special thanks to Professor Paul Rosenzweig for his guidance on previous
drafts and Associate Dean Lisa Schenck for her encouragement during the drafting process. Also
special thanks to my wife and family for their continued support, as well as my grandmother,
Marjorie Lampe, for her editorial contributions to previous drafts.
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agency will become too attenuated and assigning liability will prove to
be difficult under current liability rules. Thus, the courts will likely
struggle to harmonize the nuances of innovation with traditional
concepts of law. This paper argues that to capitalize on the benefits
offered by artificial intelligence, or more importantly to avoid its
destructive perils, it will be paramount for society and the law to
evolve.
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INTRODUCTION
Alan Turing, in his famous 1950 paper, “Computing Machinery
and Intelligence,” wrote, “we can only see a short distance ahead, but
we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”1 This sentiment,
expressed nearly 70 years ago in the context of whether machines can
think, reflects the current momentum of recent technological
breakthroughs to endow machines with the ability to make intelligent
decisions — the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI). While the
notion of AI is not novel, it has recently become a driving factor in
industry because of compounded advancements in the availability of
big data, machine learning approaches and algorithms, and powerful
computing mechanisms.2 More importantly, these technological
breakthroughs have provided tangible realizations of how AI can be
infused into nearly all domains to address society’s greatest challenges.
Even with these advancements, however, the exploration into AI is
seated in infancy as society seeks to understand and overcome the
technological, social, and legal challenges of computer systems
endowed with human characteristics and abilities.
Turing’s sentiments towards progress in AI are not unique to
technological development; rather, they stand as a modern summation
of the legal and social thinking that continues to be necessitated by
society’s reach for a scientific way to augment the human experience.
This paper is designed to further the discussion of AI governance and,
specifically, the role of liability as an indirect form of regulation. Part
I examines the technological foundation for AI, as well as the promises
and perils it holds, as a precursor to understanding the encompassing
issues of law and policy. Part II explores the technological, legal, and
social barriers to AI governance, including how governing issues are
compounded by the blended nature of AI with other technological
domains, such as privacy, big data, and cybersecurity. In light of these
challenges, it is likely that judicial decisions surrounding tort liability
will be a driving force in shaping the AI landscape. Lastly, Part III
analyzes the competencies of traditional liability regimes to remedy
harms caused by AI systems. To an extent, the concept of strict liability
is the most amenable tort regime that can be harmonized with emerging
1

A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950),
https://www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf.
2
Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 6 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf. (discussing big data, improved machine learning
approaches and algorithms, and more powerful computers as three factors that began driving
progress and enthusiasm for AI around 2010).
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AI technologies. However, as the technology pushes towards greater
autonomy in effectuating action, legal principles of agency become too
attenuated to be applicable and allocating costs for harm becomes more
complex. Absent a new approach to law and policy, it is unlikely that
current liability rules will be sufficient to satisfy the expectations of the
judiciary and the public as the underlying technologies develop.
Considering these challenges, it is likely that law and policy directed
towards AI will require society to accept solutions that may support
conflicting values but are beneficial to humanity overall.
I.

UNDERSTANDING AI, MACHINE LEARNING, AND THE ROLE
OF ALGORITHMS
A. AI, Machine Learning, and Algorithms: A Technical
Foundation

In recent years, AI has been thrust to the vanguard of technical
development as nation states, private industries, and researchers seek
to understand and exploit its potential.3 Despite its prominence in the
global technological realm, there is no universally accepted definition
for AI. In a broad sense, AI constitutes a computerized system that can
rationally solve complex problems or act appropriately to achieve an
objective.4 Some experts narrow the scope of AI based on taxonomies
that reflect the function, capabilities, or problem space of the system.5
For example, venture capitalist Frank Chen categorizes the problem
space of AI into five general groups: logical reasoning, knowledge
representation, planning and navigation, natural language processing,
and perception.6 The difficulty in defining what actually constitutes AI
stems from the expansive nature of the problems and solutions sought
to be conquered through AI, and the underlying performance of
algorithms that fuel AI development. Because the problems and
3

Louis Columbus, McKinsey’s State of Machine Learning and AI, 2017, FORBES (July 9, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2017/07/09/mckinseys-state-of-machine-learningand-ai-2017/#220930e075b6. (“Tech giants including Baidu and Google spent between $20B to
$30B on AI in 2016, with 90% of this spent on R&D and deployment, and 10% on AI
acquisitions.”)
4
Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 6 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf. (“Others define AI as a system capable of rationally solving
complex problems or taking appropriate actions to achieve its goal in whatever real-world
circumstances it encounters.”)
5
Id. (citing Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.
Pearson, 2009)).
6
Id. at 7 (citing Frank Chen, AI, Deep Learning, and Machine Learning: A Primer (June 10,
2016), http://a16z.com/2016/06/10/ai-deep-learning-machines).
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solutions to be evaluated by AI flow naturally between routine data
processing by algorithmic systems and AI machine learning that
requires intelligent computer programs, it is common for a problem to
be viewed as requiring AI to be solved, but consisting of routine data
processing once answered.7 While the definition of AI may be fluid and
inexact, at its core is the pursuit of AI applications that can systemically
produce intelligent behavior.8
Within the realm of AI and at the center of this technological
transformation is machine learning that uses a statistical approach to
apply algorithms and learn from data. While AI traditionally involves
programming rules and criteria to reach a decision, machine learning
uses algorithms to statistically evaluate large amounts of data to
repeatedly refine its decision-making processes and outcomes.
Machine learning is a subset of AI that involves methods to allow
computers to think by “creating mathematical algorithms based on
accumulated data.”9 Within machine learning is the concept of deep
learning — using neural network models to mimic human thinking. In
a sense, deep learning fuels machine learning to create artificial
intelligence. Nidhi Chappel, Director of Machine Learning at Intel,
described this as “machines learning on their own without explicit
programming.”10 She compared this process to how a child observes
the world and learns societal norms without being explicitly told the
rules.11
The inherent ambiguity and breadth of AI in an increasingly
blended world of technological advancements and big data has pushed
universal definitions of these concepts out of reach, at least for the time
being. While precise definitions of these terms are beyond the scope of
this paper, it is important to understand that substantively defining AI
and its subsets is one of the major hurdles to achieving a practical
regulatory context for AI. By defining the technology, the law will be
better suited to articulate the problems posed by AI. This is, however,
not surprising, as law almost always remains unsettled without
concrete examples and practical applications. In this context, the
7

Id. at 7 (“In some cases, opinion may shift, meaning that a problem is considered as requiring
AI before it has been solved, but once a solution is well known it is considered routing data
processing.”).
8
Id. (“Although the boundaries of AI can be uncertain and have tended to shift over time, what
is important is that a core objective of AI research and applications over the years has been to
automate or replicate intelligent behavior.”).
9
Deb Miller Landau, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How Computers Learn, IQ
BY INTEL (August 17, 2016), https://iq.intel.com/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/.
10
Id. (quoting Nidhi Chappell).
11
Id.
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enthusiasm for investing in AI is great and certain tangible applications
have already become pervasive in our daily lives. However, machine
learning algorithms — which constitute the core of AI as a vehicle for
societal change — remain in infancy, as society has only begun to
recognize the potential of AI to transform industries. It is likely that
reaching usable definitions of AI and its subcomponents will take time
as the challenges to be addressed and the fruits of the technology are
realized. In the interim, it is the obligation of technology experts, legal
experts, and regulating entities to push through these obfuscated
hurdles in pursuit of regulatory definitions that are necessary to shape
the legal, social, and political aspects of AI.12
B. Promises and Perils: The Next Step in Human Evolution?
Machines that think like humans — a concept that stands as a
technological gateway to what could be the next step in human
evolution. From autonomous driving vehicles to improving genomic
sequencing, AI has just begun to demonstrate its utility in tackling
some of the greatest challenges faced by society. On a more intimate
level, applications like speech recognition AI platforms are becoming
increasingly pervasive in our day-to-day lives. These commercialoriented forms that have specific applications, known as Narrow AI,
are becoming an extension of how humans interact with technology to
accomplish defined tasks.13 In a broader sense, General AI — a
notional future AI system that has the intelligent behavior to process
cognitive tasks — is believed to be the future of intelligent systems.14
While Narrow AI allows technology to perform specific tasks beyond
what a human can do, General AI has the potential to surpass human
performance in almost every cognitive task.15 The capability of AI
12

Defining AI and its subsets is challenging given the technological uncertainties, social
considerations, and geopolitical factors that are inherent to a technology with the potential to
change how the world operates. In this context, it is likely that defining these terms will take time
and will likely require different definitions depending on the context in which the technology is
being used.
13
Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 6 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“Remarkable progress has been made on what is known as
Narrow AI, which addresses specific application areas such as playing strategic games, language
translation, self-driving vehicles, and image recognition.”).
14
Id. (“General AI (sometimes called Artificial General Intelligence or AGI) refers to a notional
future AI system that exhibits apparently intelligent behavior at least as advanced as a person
across the full range of cognitive tasks.”)
15
Max Tegmark, Benefits & Risks of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE,
https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-artificial-intelligence/ (“While narrow AI
may outperform humans at whatever its specific task is, like playing chess or solving equations,
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systems to evaluate large amounts of complex, and sometimes
unrelated, data has the potential to solve some of the world’s most
enduring problems, leading to enormous social and economic
benefits.16 According to the Center for Data Innovation, AI is already
having a positive social and economic impact.17 The report issued by
the Center for Data Innovation highlighted 70 real-world examples of
the social and economic benefits in 14 different areas. The Center’s
director believes that this list has only scratched the surface of AI’s
social and economic value.
Despite its promises, there are, like most technological
innovations, foreseeable and speculative perils. In the short-term, AI
has the potential to disrupt job markets across the world. From factory
workers to lawyers, AI could replace the need for humans to perform
specific tasks. However, the social impact of AI is a matter of debate.
While AI may replace humans in specific jobs, many experts believe
that it has the potential to create more jobs as technology spurs new
industries.18 From a long-term perspective, AI has sparked concern that
it could be a destructive force by either being programmed to do
something devastating or to do something beneficial, but with
destructive force.19 The discussion of the practical and theoretical
benefits of AI is one that will, and should, continue during the course
of the technology’s development. However, from a legal context, there
are narrower perils that could have a significant impact on society.

AGI would outperform humans at nearly every cognitive task.”).
16
Francesca Rossi, European Parliament Legal Affairs Briefing, Artificial Intelligence:
Potential Benefits and Ethical Considerations 1, 1 (October 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/571380/IPOL_BRI%282016%2957
1380_EN.pdf. (“The ability of AI systems to transform vast amounts of complex, ambiguous
information into insight has the potential to reveal long-held secrets and help solve some of the
world’s most enduring problems.”).
17
Daniel Castro and Joshua New, The Promise of Artificial Intelligence 1, 2 (October 2016),
http://www2.datainnovation.org/2016-promise-of-ai.pdf, (citing Olivia Solon, Karim the AI
Delivers Psychological Support to Syrian Refugees, THE GUARDIAN (March 22, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technol- ogy/2016/mar/22/karim-the-ai-delivers-psychologicalsupport-to-syrian-refugees; Dina Bass, Microsoft Develops AI to Help Cancer Doctors Find the
Right Treatments, BLOOMBERG, (September 20, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-20/microsoft-develops-ai-to-help-cancerdoctors- nd- the-right-treatments).
18
See generally Douglas Eldridge, Why the Benefits of Artificial Intelligence Outweigh the Risks,
SMS WIRE (February 22, 2017), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/why-the-benefitsof-artificial-intelligence-outweigh-the-risks/.
19
Max Tegmark, Benefits & Risks of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE,
https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-artificial-intelligence/ (“when considering
how AI might become a risk, experts think two scenarios most likely: 1. The AI is programmed
to do something devastating, or 2. the AI is programmed to do something beneficial, but it
develops a destructive method for achieving its goal.”).
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Inherent in AI and machine learning systems is the aspect that the
technology’s development includes some level of programming and
emulation of principles used by human experts. This injects a
subjective human element into what is supposed to be an objective and
unbiased process that relies on data and mathematical algorithms. But
if the data or algorithm is tainted with some level of bias, then how
much faith do we have in the AI system? Does an AI system merely
create a false expectancy of fairness? No system is perfect, and perhaps
these systems, even with a certain level of algorithmic prejudice, are
better suited to perform a task in a manner more objective than that of
humans. It is likely that the answer to these questions lie with each
specific technological use and application. The subjective bias of
humans typically cannot be measured and sometimes eludes our own
conscious. It is quite conceivable that even with some level of fallacy,
AI stands to provide for greater fairness in most decision-making
processes. From criminal sentencing to acceptance at an educational
institute, AI has the potential to imperfectly perfect human decisionmaking. But for society to accept the idea that a machine can be fairer
than a human requires certain levels of transparency, accountability,
and understandability must be accounted for in the technological
process that results in a machine that can learn, think, and act in
society’s best interest.
C. The Regulatory Landscape
1. The United States
In the United States, public and private sectors have placed a
heavy focus on the development of AI and machine learning systems.
Taking into consideration the short and long-term benefits and
concerns of AI, the United States has assessed that the benefits of AI
are vast, and the development of AI is critical to the country’s
economic and social vitality.20 As such, the United States has devoted
significant resources to developing AI and seeks to be at the forefront
of AI research.21 From a regulatory perspective, the United States has
assessed that any broad regulation of AI is inappropriate in the current
stage of AI and machine learning. As with other technologies that have
20

Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 5 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“The current and projected benefits of AI technology are
large, adding to the Nation’s economic vitality and to the productivity and well-being of its
people.”).
21
Id. (“The United States has been at the forefront of foundational research in AI.”).
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the potential to significantly impact the global socioeconomic platform,
regulation in the early stages of development has the potential to hinder
progress in the field. Russian President Vladimir Putin echoed the
importance of AI when he stated, “whoever becomes the leader in [AI]
will become the ruler of the world.”22 This statement reflects what has
been called the new global arms race for superpowers.23 Thus, it is clear
why the United States is not ready to insert a broad regulatory
framework into the AI arena. However, this reluctance is not solely
based on efforts to win the AI development race, and it does not
necessarily mean that the United States is averse to tailored regulation
in the future.
The applicability of AI is expansive and already touches on
multiple industries that are regulated to protect the public and promote
fair competition. The approach of the United States towards regulating
AI is based on an informed assessment that accounts for the benefits of
the technology, the associated risks to public safety, and potential
barriers to innovation.24 Under this approach, when the risk of an AIenabled product falls within the realm of an existing regulatory regime,
it should be considered whether current regulations already consider
the risks in a sufficient manner. If the protections in place are
inadequate, existing regulations should be modified and expanded to
provide the necessary safeguards while accounting for AI innovation
and growth. For example, fully autonomous vehicles are at our
doorstep. Rather than seeking to regulate the underlying AI technology,
the states and the Federal government are looking to broaden motor
vehicle regulations to account for self-driving vehicles. In doing so, the
government attempts to minimize barriers to innovation while
maintaining its obligation to protect the public.
While the United States government seems to be content to refrain
from broadly regulating AI and machine learning for the time being,
there is significant debate in the technology industry as to whether this
is the right decision. The more alarmist and extreme approach, echoed
by technology entrepreneur Elon Musk, urges for government
regulation in this field because he believes AI poses an existential
22

See Tom Simonite, For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligences Fuels New Global Arms Race,
WIRED (September 8, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificialintelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/.
23
See generally id.
24
Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 17 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“In doing so, agencies must remain mindful of the
fundamental purpose and goals of regulation to safeguard the public good, while creating space
for innovation and growth in AI.”).
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threat to human civilization.25 However, the United States government
believes that even if the more science-fiction threat of AI is true, it does
not change how the problem should be addressed today. Essentially,
even if AI poses a long-term threat of super-intelligent machines
capable of surpassing humanity’s control, it does not change how the
technology should be pushed forward today. The National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) Committee on Technology has
determined that the best way to build the capacity to address these longterm speculations is to tackle the short-term and less extreme security,
privacy, and safety risks of AI.26
2. The European Union and the Right to an
Explanation
Beyond the United States, other democratic nations have taken a
more substantive approach to regulating AI. In particular, the European
Union passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which
seeks to, in part, harmonize data privacy laws across Europe. The
regulation includes non-discrimination requirements for algorithmic
profiling and a right to obtain an explanation of automated decisions
that significantly affect users.27 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman
have suggested that this could require “a complete overhaul of
standards and widely used algorithmic techniques,” and reflects how
important human interpretability is to algorithmic design.28
While some argue that this regulation is a harmful restriction of
AI,29 Goodman and Flaxman contended that it simply creates an
25

See generally Brett Molina, Musk: Government needs to regulate artificial intelligence (July
17, 2017), USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/07/17/muskgovernment-needs-regulate-artificial-intelligence/484318001/
26
Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 8 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“The NSTC Committee on Technology’s assessment is that
long-term concerns about super-intelligent General AI should have little impact on current policy.
The policies the Federal Government should adopt in the near-to-medium term if these fears are
justified are almost exactly the same policies the Federal Government should adopt if they are not
justified.”).
27
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
Recital 71, arts. 13-14, 22, 2016 O.J. L 119/1 [hereinafter GDPR].
28
Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, European Union regulations on algorithmic decisionmaking and a “right to explanation” 1, 1 (August 31, 2016),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.08813.pdf.
29
See generally Nick Wallace, EU’s Right to Explanation: A Harmful Restriction on Artificial
Intelligence (January 25, 2017),
http://www.techzone360.com/topics/techzone/articles/2017/01/25/429101-eus-right-
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opportunity to ensure transparency and fairness in algorithmic design.
The United States has not taken significant regulatory steps towards
algorithmic accountability, but it has acknowledged the importance of
transparency and fairness in the development of AI. 30 There is a fine
line between regulatory actions that will infuse AI and algorithmic
machine learning with democratic values of fairness, and those that will
create barriers to innovation. At the very least, regulatory efforts to
promote transparency and accountability in AI should be explored as
the fruits of the technology and the underlying problems posed by
innovation continue to develop. The inclusion of these concepts is not
only paramount to ensuring justice in a technology that stands to be
broadly implemented across industries but may also be critical to social
acceptance of AI and algorithmic machine learning applications.
II.

NAVIGATING THE FOG OF INNOVATION: THE
TECHNOLOGICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL HURDLES TO
GOVERNING AI

Beyond the technological hurdles to mastering AI are legal and
social challenges. The complexity of these issues is compounded by
the fact that AI does not exist in a vacuum. The development and
implementation of AI and machine learning is intertwined with data
rights, privacy rights, intellectual property protection, ethics, civil
rights, due process, geopolitics, and social values, among other
considerations. At the core of these issues are the transparency,
accountability, and understandability of AI in the judicial system. To
ensure fairness and safety, it is expected that AI systems be free of
unjustified discrimination and unintended consequences. To promote
confidence in these systems, it is necessary that evidentiary
mechanisms exist to demonstrate the lack of unintended
consequences.31 Taken a step further, the social acceptance of AI
technologies is partially dependent on the existence of legal means to
remedy unintended consequences. Part A of this section explores the
legal goals and social expectations for a fully integrated AI society, and
Part B addresses the problems that stand in the way of reaching these
goals and realizing these expectations. Finally, in Part C of this section,
explanation-harmful-restriction-artificial-intelligence.htm#
30
Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 30 (October 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“The use of AI to make consequential decisions about
people, often replacing decisions made by human actors and institutions, leads to concerns about
how to ensure justice, fairness, and accountability.”).
31
See generally id. at 30.
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the function of judicial decision-making is explored with an emphasis
on the significant role that liability litigation is likely to play in shaping
the AI landscape.
A. The Discovery of Goals and Expectations: From Legally
Simple to Socially Complex
Recent triumphs in AI development have sparked an awakening
of the potential utility of AI. Certain AI systems and machine-learned
processes have already entered the daily lives of almost all individuals.
From the use of AI autopilot systems in commercial flights to the use
of AI for facial recognition on social media sites, certain autonomous
machine intelligence processes have quietly become a societal norm.32
While society has yet to experience the scaled infusion of AI into all
sectors of our industry, an automated economy fueled by AI may soon
be at our doorstep.33 Across domains, technology continues to provide
the seed for imagining new, tangible applications of AI. With each
formation of a practical application, society begins to forecast the legal
and social considerations of its use and is often faced with
contradictory positions. Although these deliberations are typically
driven by economics, questions of legal consequences and social
expectations underpin any discussion. When considering the scaled
application of AI across society, it is necessary to broadly understand
the goals of the law and expectations of society.
From a legal perspective, the goals of governing AI are simple —
reduce uncertainty and protect consumers without inhibiting
innovation. While these concepts are straightforward in idea, they are
far from simple in application. From the likelihood of harming the
public to providing predictable measures of liability, uncertainty in the
law can take many forms. In general, AI governance should be
highlighted by some form of validation and verification — making sure
an AI system or process does what it is designed to do and providing a
mechanism of confirmation to an extent generally accepted by society.
However, as discussed later in this paper, while scholars can articulate
where the law needs to be in terms of governance, getting there
involves complex legal and policy questions. More importantly, there
is a cyclical effect in how social expectations drive legal goals and viceversa. Put simply, social expectations influence how society seeks to
32

See generally Gautam Narula, Everyday Examples of Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning (February 14, 2017), https://www.techemergence.com/everyday-examples-of-ai/.
33
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govern AI, but are in-turn influenced by the legal mechanisms in place
to account for the unexpected and unjust outcomes that sit on the
fringes of technical application.
While policymakers and scholars can speak generally of the broad
and lofty legal goals for governing AI, the narrow legal objectives and
social expectations are more challenging. Each application of AI does
not exist in a vacuum and may be heavily dependent on existential
influences — privacy, big data, or security concerns, among others.
Society may be willing to accept a specific AI technology, such as selfdriving cars, when the benefits to society clearly outweigh the risk of
potential harm. However, how does this change when AI is being
implemented on a large scale across society? How much deferment to
artificial systems is too much, and how does this change as AI becomes
scalable on an intimate level? Are we willing to accept artificial
intelligence that can drive us to a hospital or even provide a diagnosis,
but not a system that decides whether we are eligible for care? In this
domain, like many that are at the forefront of innovation, the only
certainty is uncertainty. Society may not yet be able to define social
expectations for AI. The only guarantee is that large-scale disruption is
likely on the horizon, and policymakers will have to consider the legal
and social consequences of this transformation.
The social and economic benefits of AI and machine learning
processes only go as far as society perceives that the technology is
fulfilling its purpose without unjustified bias, prejudice, or harm. As
such, the success of this technology is premised on the idea that an AI
system must perform its function in a just and fair manner with a
minimal and publicly acceptable deviation from absolute expectations.
Given the prevalence that algorithms and AI are expected to have in
our daily lives, there are certain democratic principles of due process
that should be incorporated into algorithmic development to account
for a remedy in the instance of harm by an AI system — transparency,
accountability, and understandability.34 However, achieving sufficient
levels of justice and fairness in due process is subjective and dependent
on the area in which AI is being applied. Society should not expect the
same levels of justice and fairness in all domains. Assuring
transparency, accountability, and understandability is not an absolute
when it comes to AI, it is a spectrum.
How this spectrum is defined moves beyond a legal issue and
requires an understanding of social sensibilities as they relate to AI.
Despite efforts to perfect an algorithm, the possibility of unintended
34

See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014).
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consequences exist. When AI is used to decide in place of human
judgment or to supplement a human decision-making process that has
significant consequences, what levels of fairness and accountability are
expected to ensure justice? Generally, the level of expected due process
is directly proportional to the contiguity of an algorithm to a more
fundamental right or critical decision. Put another way, as an algorithm
becomes more significant to a decision that by nature requires a higher
degree of legal protection, there is a greater need for algorithmic due
process. While this may be simple in theory, the complexity of this
paradigm makes AI governance an elusive task as the very nature of
trying to define the expectations, consequences, and remedies for AIbased harms can easily create multiple and conflicting legal and social
positions. Moving forward, the ability of society and the law to
conceive mechanisms of accountability for these conflicting values to
coexist may define the pace of AI’s immersion into humanity.
B. Legal and Social Hurdles to Governing AI Systems
Rapid innovation across various technological domains has
compounded the problem of technology outpacing the law. As
technology builds on technology, governing mechanisms that are still
trying to understand and account for previous innovations struggle to
incorporate additional regulatory, ethical, and privacy considerations
brought about by “the next big thing.” AI and machine learning are no
exception. From the Internet to cybersecurity to big data to the Internet
of Things (IoT), and now AI, intrinsic to each realm are unresolved
considerations surrounding data rights, privacy rights, intellectual
property, ethics, due process, social values, and geopolitical concerns.
Trying to govern a single technological domain has proven to be
difficult enough, yet alone blended worlds of overlapping technologies
that complicate regulatory structures at all levels. From local to
international governing bodies, the law is lost in the fog of innovation.
Meanwhile, societal acceptance and social mores struggle to harmonize
the complexity of these technologies that alter the human experience.
The underlying problem of governing AI and related technologies
is highlighted by the legal and social trade-offs that have so far eluded
regulators. For example, restrictions on big data and privacy can
significantly hinder AI systems that rely on available data to perfect
their machine-learned processes. Whether it is the “going dark”35
35

See generally, James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Going Dark: Are
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delivered at the Brookings Institution, available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/goingdark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course.

2019]

Artificial Intelligence

49

problem or controversy surrounding section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),36 society struggles to strike a
balance between privacy and national security.37 Moreover, opposing
sides tend to take absolute positions that obscure the issue at hand and
exacerbate the problem of finding new legal approaches to emerging
technologies.38 For AI, it often seems that the public puts a premium
on privacy, while still expecting the benefits of AI systems where the
commercial utility is derived from surpluses of consumer data.39
Governments at all levels, from local legislators to international
regulators, are experiencing the challenge of broadly governing AI
technologies.40 Legislative bodies continue to wrestle with regulating
intricate new systems that are rapidly changing and being scaled across
industries and society. Uncertainty as to how AI systems will interact
with the other complex systems and the economic impact this may have
on the development of AI and machine learning systems complicates
the question of how to regulate AI. Some existing domains, such as the
automobile industry, have more easily embraced some forms of AI
regulation.41 This is perhaps because of the impending transformation
of the automobile industry that can no longer be ignored.42 It is also
likely in part because a federal governing body, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), already exists to harmonize
new technologies with existing laws.
In other areas, however, there is greater concern as to whether
existence of any regulation of AI systems would stifle innovation. For
example, it is possible that the accuracy and performance of AI systems
36

See generally Sneha Indrajit et al., FISA’s Section 702 & the Privacy Conundrum: Surveillance
in the U.S. and Globally (October 25, 2017), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/controversycomparisons-data-collection-fisas-section-702/.
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See generally April F. Doss, Why Changes in Data Science Are Driving a Need For Quantum
Law and Policy, and How We Get There, 14 ABA SCITECH LAWYER 38, 40 (Fall 2017).
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See id. (discussing how black-and-white views related to national security and privacy obscure
the complexity of issues faced by society).
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See id. at 41 (discussing consumer demands for privacy).
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See generally Bianca Datta, Can Government Keep Up with Artificial Intelligence? (August
10, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/ai-government-policy/.
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Gabrielle Orum Hernández, Interstate Regulatory Alignment: Keys to The Self-Driving Car?
(November 2, 2017),
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/sites/legaltechnews/2017/11/02/interstate-regulatoryalignment-keys-to-the-self-driving-car/ (“Despite most regulatory action at the state level, 62
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Aarian Marshall, Congress Finally Gets Serious About Regulating Self-Driving Cars, WIRED
(July 19, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/congress-autonomous-self-driving-carregulations/ (discussing how emerging technologies in self-driving vehicles is causing parties
ranging from tech companies to government watchdogs to agree that the time has come for
Congress to regulate autonomous vehicles).
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would be jeopardized if engineers were required to prematurely or
unnecessarily incorporate functional mechanisms during the
developmental process to ensure principles of algorithmic due process
— transparency, accountability, and understandability.43 In contrast, as
more trust is placed in AI systems, the lack of these fundamental
principles or poor regulatory mechanisms threatens to undermine any
benefits offered by AI and machine learning technologies.44 Any
regulatory miscalculation runs the potential of stifling the
transformation of industries that are increasingly betting the future on
AI technologies.45 It is not to say that some form of regulation should
not be the ultimate goal or that it is even unlikely. Under the Obama
administration, the United States began the conversation about the
future of AI regulation.46 However, there is no indication that the
United States intends to significantly and broadly regulate AI systems
anytime soon.
An alternative to direct regulation of AI systems is the creation of
a centralized agency or commission for AI technologies. This would,
at the least, allow expertise to be vested to agencies or commissions
that can act more quickly than Congress and keep pace with emerging
technologies. Any such body would likely be responsible for
identifying principles to govern the development and application of AI,
as well as enforcing any promulgated standards. In the United
Kingdom, calls for an AI commission have been greater than in the
United States.47 However, domestically, the application of AI has yet
to warrant the creation of a government entity focused on AI.48 Rather,
43

Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AU Under the Law: The Role of Explanation
(November 3, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.01134.pdf (“there exist concerns that the
engineering challenges surrounding explanation from AI systems would stifle innovation; that
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2017),
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See generally Ajay Agrawal et al., The Obama Administration’s Roadmap for AI Policy
(December 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/the-obama-administrations-roadmap-for-ai-policy.
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independent federal agencies have begun to assume the challenge of
regulating AI in their respective domains. For example, the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has assembled a team to
oversee the use of AI in diagnosing medical conditions.49 Similarly, the
NHTSA has published voluntary guidelines for driverless cars.50 The
lack of federal legislation in the United States and the use of voluntary
guidelines by respective agencies may certainly be a sign that the
government is relying on private industry and market demands for safe
products to drive the development of AI systems.
Even if Congress sought to govern AI through legislation, it is
questionable as to whether this is even a task suited for the legislative
branch. The tedious and reactionary nature of the legislative process is
not matched to keep pace with emerging technologies. Some scholars,
such as April F. Doss, argue that our current governing system is
insufficient to address the complexity of emerging technologies, and
that it is paramount for law and policy mechanisms to evolve to keep
pace.51 While the field is certainly ripe for change, a viable regulatory
solution for AI systems and their overlapping technologies continues
to elude policymakers and technology experts. In contrast to broad
regulation, the more likely approach has been to pursue guidelines and
standards that are more flexible and favorable to business investments
in AI.
Initiatives in the private industry have emerged, such as those by
52
IBM and nonprofits like AI Global and the Future of Life Institute.53
Similarly, organizations like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers have begun to pursue standards in AI and robotics.54 These
standards are not limited to the technical exploration of AI, but include
the ethical and moral concerns of AI developers and users. As AI
progresses to the point where regulatory standards can be developed, it
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is likely that these standards will be derived from best practices
promulgated in a manner similar to the National Institute of Science
and Technology’s (NIST) cybersecurity guidelines.55 In the absence of
any regulation of AI on the horizon, set standards would likely have a
significant impact on the AI landscape in the United States. Through
standardized approaches to developing and testing AI systems, the
United States is moving to an industry and liability approach to
governing AI that has the potential to vest the judicial system with
significant influence in shaping the future of AI.
C.

Judicial Decision-Making as a Driving Force in
Governance

AI and the technological domains it touches have proven to be
problematic for direct regulation. From data privacy to cybersecurity,
regulation has been a fragmented process that eludes traditional
vehicles of law and policy. Absent unequivocal regulation,
transforming industries seeking to capitalize on the benefits of AI have
begun to look towards an industry-driven approach where guidelines
and best practices provide some level of security to direct investment.
Arguably, this approach will provide greater adaptability and flexibility
than direct legislation in keeping pace with emerging and rapidly
developing technologies. It is not to say that this approach is ideal. The
business interests of private industry may not be aligned with those of
society as a whole and may even contradict public safety concerns. As
the sentiments of Ms. Doss were previously conveyed, increasingly
complex issues in technology, privacy, and security foster a need for a
new approach in law and policy to counter the uncertainty of emerging
technologies.56 However, until a new way of thinking takes hold,
standards, guidelines, and best practices are likely to rule the AI world,
and judicial decision-making will follow right behind.
Assigning and quantifying liability for actions taken or influenced
by AI systems will play a significant role in the maturation of the AI
landscape. With the development of standards and best practices in AI
development, testing, and application, AI will fall into the purview of
the court system through tort liability. While the intricacies of liability
in a world of AI are uncertain and stand in the early stages of
exploration, as discussed in Section III, standardized approaches to AI
and machine learning systems will require the courts to weigh in. On a
55

Id. (suggesting that regulatory standards can be built on existing ones, such as the U.S. National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for cryptography).
56
April F. Doss, Why Changes in Data Science Are Driving a Need For Quantum Law and Policy,
and How We Get There, 14 ABA SCITECH LAWYER 38, 42 (Fall, 2017).

2019]

Artificial Intelligence

53

case-by-case basis, the judicial system will slowly serve as an indirect
form of regulation through the development of legal standards,
precedence, and subsequent deterrence. However, there are inherent
fallacies that cast doubt on the effectiveness of using the judicial
system to indirectly regulate AI.
A serious weakness within the judicial system is the lack of
technological expertise. Few judges and lawyers have sufficient
technological training to fully understand and judicially account for
complex technologies that have already been brought before the courts.
Several legal scholars have proffered that it is incumbent on the legal
community to teach certain aspects in law school to help prepare legal
enterprises to tackle the issues that lie ahead.57 However, this long-term
solution does not provide immediate relief for the technological storm
at the shores of the judiciary system. As Chief Justice Roberts
suggested, “[judges] haven’t yet really absorbed how [AI] is going to
change the way we do business.”58 Another significant limit of the
judiciary is the remedial nature of courts. Courts are designed to correct
or compensate for harm that has already occurred. Although legal
precedence will certainly have a deterring effect, the process of
establishing legal norms may have difficulty keeping up with the
accelerated pace of AI development given the lengthy litigation process
that is common in legal cases surrounding complex technologies.59 A
final drawback of the judiciary system to indirectly govern AI is the
court’s narrow focus.60 Judicial exploration is typically limited to
specific facts relevant to the harm and risk involved and does not
typically account for broader considerations surrounding the social and
economic benefits of emerging technologies.61
Despite the limitations of judicial decision-making to influence
the governance of AI, there are strengths in the judiciary that make it
suited to be a driving force in governing emerging technologies.
Although the judicial system may lack technical knowledge, courts
have significant expertise in allocating responsibility. In the world of
57
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AI and autonomy, there can be numerous entities involved in the
development and implementation of an AI product that results in harm,
and the courts are perhaps best equipped to allocate responsibility
across an enterprise of defendants.62 Further, when uncertainty is high,
the legal fact-finding processes of the tort system can be a dominant
force in developing specific and relevant information when causation
is in question.63 While at times the litigation process may be tedious
and adversarial to the detriment of the public as a whole, it does provide
for a natural, albeit slow, development of the law where workable
solutions are promulgated across jurisdictions and harmful laws are
rejected or modified.64
These benefits demonstrate that deferring to judicial decisionmaking to indirectly govern AI systems and emerging technologies is
not completely the result of a lack of a better alternative. Rather, it is a
reflection of a fragmented legal and policy process that struggles to
absorb complex and esoteric technologies scaled across industries and
society. AI may be at the world’s doorstep, but full autonomy in these
technologies has not yet warranted rash action to curb systems that may
prove to have significant benefits to society. While the capacity of AI
as a tool for humanity seems to become more transparent day by day,
legal and social regimes can only speculate as to the latent benefits to
society that fully autonomous systems may hold. It is, therefore, quite
possible that the ability of current liability regimes to address the
questions posed by current AI technologies -- those that are more useful
than revolutionary -- may pave the way for how society manages fully
autonomous and truly intelligent AI that may be yet to come.
III.

TRADITIONAL LIABILITY REGIMES AND AI SYSTEMS

As the spectrum of intelligent machines, from General AI to fully
autonomous and intelligence systems capable of independent learning,
continues to evolve, the judiciary will be required to confront
increasingly complex issues of liability. Litigation surrounding harms
caused by automated machines and AI systems has already entered the
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courts purview.65 However, as the underlying technologies push
towards greater autonomy, the limits of common law tort regimes will
be tested as the application of new technologies to traditional theories
of liability becomes increasingly convoluted. How well the judiciary
responds and applies current legal frameworks to effectively remedy
harms is likely to play a significant role in the future of AI governance
as the technology pushes towards greater autonomy. This section
explores the application of liability claims involving AI systems to
common law tort regimes.
Part A introduces the relevance of legal identity as it relates to AI
technologies by examining how the legal identity of an AI system plays
a significant role in the application of common law tort claims. Part A
also explores the idea that as AI systems assume more autonomy,
traditional liability claims will be more strained in addressing
respective harms. In Part B, current legal frameworks of liability are
assessed as applied to harm caused by AI systems. Finally, Part C
suggests that there is no common solution to the liability problem of
AI systems, and that the law will likely require a blended approach to
address the legal challenges on the horizon. The ability of current law
and policy regimes will not be able to solve, but only manage, the novel
legal issues that arise as technology pushes the envelope of autonomy
and machine intelligence. Eventually, the scientific advancements that
seek to enhance the human experience will likely require an evolution
of law and policy.
A. Identifying the Defendant: Principal-Agent vs. Alternate
Legal Identities
How an AI system is perceived and the legal status it is afforded
is fundamental to resolving issues of liability for harms caused by
autonomous systems. When the mark of human contribution is
apparent in the decision of an autonomous system, common law
principles of liability may be sufficient to find fault.66 In instances of
an identifiable defect in an AI system, product or manufacturer liability
may vest responsibility for the harm to the developers or those involved
in the production chain of an AI system. Furthermore, under the
principal-agent concept, an AI system could be considered an agent of
65
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a manufacturer or other entity that, in some form or another, directs or
is responsible for the harm caused. In this instance, when the law can
point to some discernible level of human involvement, common law
tort regimes may be suited to remedy a situation. However, as
discussed in Part B of this section, the applicability of traditional
liability regimes to AI is not clear and may likely be deficient to
adequately protect the public when complex technologies are involved.
As AI systems move towards greater autonomy, existing liability
rules are likely to become insufficient for assigning fault for harms
caused by AI technologies. A fully independent autonomous machine
— one that is so far removed from human control that it acts based on
its own analysis and without direct human input — certainly brings into
question the principal-agent concept. In this instance, does such human
deferment to a machine break any connection to the manufacturer or
creators of the underlying algorithms to the extent that a machine could
no longer be viewed as an agent of a principal? If so, to whom, or what,
should fault be accorded? Perhaps a failure to introduce appropriate
data in the machine learning process or failing to reasonably forecast a
potential outcome could pivot the spotlight of responsibility to an entity
in the production chain. But what about when fault is unclear, cannot
be determined, or is the result of an unforeseen harm? Does the concept
of res ipsa loquitur apply? These questions reflect the anticipated strain
that AI is expected to place on common law principles of liability.
Alternatives to making liability determinations based on the
agency of an AI system have been offered and revolve around different
concepts of legal identity. Over twenty-five years ago, Lawrence
Solum explored the idea of whether AI could become a legal person.67
At the time, Solum believed this inquiry was only theoretical because
the technology to justify judicial review of the matter was lacking. 68
However, the recent emergence of more autonomous AI systems has
shown that the time for this judicial inquiry may soon be here. While
the notion of treating AI as a person may seem unnatural, the concept
of juridical persons that are recognized in law as having duties and
rights of those of natural persons shows that the idea of endowing
machines with the legal status of a person is not so far-fetched.69 After
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all, this bestowment has already occurred in numerous instances for
corporations.70
The idea of some form of corporate personhood for individual AI
systems could make these technologies civilly or criminally liable for
their actions. However, under current thinking, even if such a status
was granted in the eyes of the law, “robots cannot be sued.”71
Furthermore, in the instance of a liable robot defendant, compensation
would still be required at a corporate level. While this would likely
occur in some form of insurance either individually or as a pool,
obligations for compensation could be passed to the owner of the
system where the owner is strictly liable for the harm of the AI
system.72 Similarly, an AI system could be treated as an employee and
the owner as an employer. In this instance, the owner may be required
to ensure some adequate level of supervision.73
The question of legal identity is not straightforward and will likely
be complicated by the nuances of specific technologies. The only
certainty in this realm is that shifts to greater autonomy in AI will
continue to drive a need to, at the very least, reassess the capacity of
traditional liability regimes to provide just compensation for those
harmed. Until technology forces the judiciary to adopt new frameworks
of legal identity for AI systems, it is likely that litigation will be driven
by the view that principals, such as developers, manufacturers, and
owners, are directly responsible for the AI they choose to implement.
As traditional forms of liability are increasingly tested, new legal
questions will be raised that will result in justified uncertainty as to how
adept the judiciary system is to meet the liability challenges brought
forth by AI.
B. Applying Traditional Liability Regimes
With the rise of autonomy in AI systems, the legal community and
society will be forced to consider novel questions of liability
surrounding wrongful acts made or influenced by AI. Where a
sufficient connection is apparent between harm caused by an AI system
70
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and the underlying human contribution, legal questions of
responsibility are more evident. In instances of a programming error or
identifiable manufacturing defect, fault may be clear. However, as
technology becomes more complex and convoluted, whether it be more
lines of code or more entities involved in the production process,
traditional avenues of assigning responsibility will become less
apparent. This sub-section explores traditional theories of liability for
determining fault as applied to the farther end of the AI spectrum -when autonomy is significant, and culpability cannot be easily
discerned.
Product liability as a legal framework is perhaps the most
acceptable form of assigning responsibility for harm arising from AI
technologies. It typically involves claims surrounding a manufacturing
defect, design defect, information defect, or a failure to warn. From
flawed programming to using low quality data during the machine
learning process to failing to fully warn a consumer of dangerous
consequences, AI can certainly fall within the purview of product
liability. However, product liability is premised on the idea that fault is
discernible. For example, if a plane crashes because of an error in the
autopilot system, the law will likely hold the developer of the system
liable either directly or through indemnification. In this instance, the
legal analysis falls squarely within the realm of product liability in
some form or another.74 Conversely, it is not to say that this analysis
would be straightforward. AI technologies are complex, so it is likely
that litigation may be muddled by a fact-finding process laced with
finger pointing and compounded questions of blame.
The courts were recently confronted with an issue that will likely
challenge AI claims in a similar fashion — whether an auto
manufacturer can be held liable for a defect when the presence of a
defect can be inferred, but not identified. In a case involving vehicles
manufactured by Toyota, a suspected software defect caused a sudden
acceleration that could not be stopped by the driver.75 In these cases,
engineers were unable to identify a design or manufacturing flaw that
caused the sudden acceleration.76 Although the plaintiffs could not
isolate a specific defect, the court found that there was sufficient
evidence to which a reasonable jury could infer that the accident was
74
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more than likely caused by the car and not the driver.77 Given the
substantial number of complaints and commonalities among them,
Toyota has sought to settle cases for economic and personal injury
claims.78
The more difficult consideration is whether product liability is
sufficient to correct harm when it cannot be reasonably inferred that a
defect contributed to the injury. When an AI machine begins to deviate
from its programmed priorities, a sign of true autonomy, agency
principles become less relevant.79 This bares the questions, what is it
about autonomy that can render it defective within the meaning of the
law and how do we manage these risks? When there is injury without
a discernible flaw, defect, or failure arising from human contribution,
who should bare the loss? Traditional concepts of product liability will
likely fail to provide relief because a manufacturing defect cannot be
identified, and the reasonableness of a jury to infer the cause of the
harm will become increasingly attenuated.
Absent direct evidence of fault, the law has traditionally looked
towards the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The idea that the very nature
of harm infers negligence, however, does not resolve the questions of
liability for fully autonomous systems. Under res ipsa loquitur, a
defendant can negate any inference of the necessary elements of duty
of care, breach, and causation by an evidential showing that the
defendant’s conduct was not negligent.80 More importantly, this
doctrine surrounds the inference that someone was a fault. If the harm
in question is unexplainable, untraceable, and rare, then the elements
of res ipsa loquitur likely cannot be satisfied. This doctrine may,
however, survive a determination of fault when an injury is not rare and
a commonality exists between potential plaintiffs.81 In this instance,
similar to the Toyota litigation, it may be easier for a jury to infer that
something must have gone wrong to cause the injuries in question.
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Some scholars, such as Professor of Law David C. Vladeck, have
proposed that determining fault must be removed from the equation
when a failure cannot be reasonably attributed to the product.82 In terms
of self-driving cars, Professor Vladeck contends that a strict liability
regime that deviates from standard negligence claims is required
because the technologically complex nature of these systems can make
it impossible for an injured party to overcome the traditional defenses
to negligence.83 This position is also premised on the idea that the
advanced capacity of these systems is so great that they are not
expected to fail.84 Where the benefits to society of an autonomous
technology are so abundant and the risks so rare, a strict liability regime
may in some cases be sufficient to account for the fringe cases of harm
caused by an AI system. At the very least, it would likely reduce
uncertainty in support of innovation.
Taken a step further, it is possible that a strict liability system
would have a deterring effect that would serve the goals of an AIintegrated society when the risk-benefit dichotomy is not so clear.
Developers and manufacturers of autonomous AI systems would be
discouraged from taking a product to market that is lacking in effective
safeguards. While this may stifle innovation in the sense that it would
slow the pace in which a product reaches consumers, companies
seeking to reduce uncertainty may be influenced to maximize utility
and minimize risk before sale. Should science prove correct, driverless
vehicles will be a prime example where the benefits to society so
outweigh the risks of rare and unexplainable harms that those in the
production process can predictably absorb the costs of harm.85
Similarly, a strict liability regime may indirectly push developers of
other technologies who seek to capitalize on the economic benefits of
implementing AI into their industries towards a similar cost-benefit
scenario that is mutually beneficial for industry and society.
With strict liability comes the task of appropriating damages, who
should bear the costs of harm? The most likely entity to be responsible
would be the manufacturer because the manufacturer is the entity that
typically controls how, when, and at what cost an AI system enters the
82
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market. In doing so, the manufacturer can offset liability costs by
incorporating some form of an insurance premium into the sale price.86
However, a narrow view of allocating liability costs to the
manufacturer can be flawed. AI technologies are complex and likely to
have many “hands in the pot” as a product goes to market. Given the
inherent problem of determining fault among the numerous
programmers and developers, it could very likely be that the
undeterminable fault lies with one or more entities in the production
chain. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to spread the costs across
the companies involved.87 More importantly, placing monetary
responsibility solely on the manufacturer contrasts with the overall goal
of public safety. Insulating those that produce a component of an AI
system may encourage product development that sacrifices the public
interest for economic benefits beholden only to a single entity.
In the context addressed so far, strict liability has been considered
for cases such as self-driving vehicles where the AI technology was
directly involved in the harm. But it is also necessary to consider how
allocating costs under a strict liability regime fares when the connection
between the technology and the victim is separated by some degree.
This problem can be envisioned by considering the use of AI in
professional judgment. If an autonomous AI system — one that learns,
thinks, and acts absent of human control — makes a recommendation,
and a medical doctor acts based on this information to the detriment of
a patient, should those in the production chain still bare some cost of
the injury even if the outcome was highly unanticipated? This scenario
creates a litany of issues, such as the duty of care a medical provider
owes to his or her patient when AI technologies are involved in
treatment.
This issue will become even more complex when externalities,
such as insurance coverage, come into play. Can a doctor forego the
recommended treatment of an AI system in favor of a care that is more
complimentary to insurance coverage? If the doctor chooses to make
insurance coverage a priority, are the entities that helped create the
technology absolved from paying damages even though the
recommendation of the system was unrealistic given the totality of the
circumstances. These dilemmas only scratch the surface of legal issues
that are apt to arise as AI becomes infused into more and more domains.
86

Id. at 148 (“because the manufacturer sets the price for the vehicle, and so the manufacturer
can build in an “insurance premium” into the vehicle’s sale price to offset expected liability
costs.”).
87
Id. at 148 (discussing concerns associated with making a manufacturer bare all costs of liability
versus a cost-spreading approach that requires suppliers of the final product to absorb some costs
of liability).

62

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

More importantly, they demonstrate how current liability regimes will
be strained to account for the nuances of AI technologies. While a strict
liability regime may be a broad solution to the liability of AI systems,
the law will likely struggle to apply these concepts to AI across the
board.
C. The Long-Term Reality: Narrowing the Gap Between Law
and Technology
Traditional mechanisms of determining fault and assigning costs
to compensate those harmed by AI are expected to vex current liability
regimes as the technology pushes towards fully autonomy. Absent a
new approach to law and policy, it is unlikely that current liability rules
will be sufficient to satisfy the expectations of the judiciary and the
public. With each technology, industry, and application, there will exist
nuances that cannot be accounted for under common-law tort regimes.
This problem faced by society, a lack of a uniform solution to the
liability of AI, will likely require a blended approach that incorporates
various elements of tort law. AI does not exist in a vacuum, nor will its
solutions. Society will likely be required to accept remedies that may,
at times, be laced with conflicting values but are largely beneficial to
humanity. Liability is just one consideration in the multifaceted world
of AI and governance. One could argue that AI is so complex that
specific technologies cannot be effectively governed across the board;
rather, society’s approach must be geared towards governing specific
applications and outcomes. Across the world of innovation, the law
struggles to keep pace. How society narrows the gap, if at all, will
require legal ingenuity on par with the same technical innovations that
spawn a new world where the human experience is augmented by
machines.
CONCLUSION
For AI in the law, the challenges are great, the scope is vast, and
the implications are significant. In the realm of imagination, AI is a
spectrum of utility ranging from mundane tasks to the ability to think,
learn, and act in a manner more intelligent than humans. Although AI
technology stands in a relative infant state, scientific breakthroughs are
rapidly shifting specific applications of AI from a conceptual dream to
a tangible reality. With each concrete realization, the debate over the
utility of AI is invigorated with questions of law and social policy. As
with other emerging technologies, AI will continue to push for new
approaches in law and policy as it stands to disrupt normal notions of
governance. In the near-term, AI technologies will likely elude
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regulatory efforts and instead be subject to case-by-case determinations
of liability in civil courts. However, as the technology moves towards
greater autonomy, it will become increasingly more difficult to
harmonize the nuances of innovation with traditional concepts of law.
Moving forward, to capitalize on the benefits offered by AI, or more
importantly to avoid its destructive perils, it will be paramount for
society and the law to evolve.

